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What is the real national security problem concerning a myriad of stories about (1) Chinese military
intelligence funneling funds to the Democratic National Committee during the 1996 United States (US)
Presidential campaign; (2) antecedent, concurrent, and/or subsequent decisions to facilitate Chinese
launching of US commercial satellites; and (3) the consequences of (1) and (2)?
As to (1), covert action and overt influence operations entailing funneling funds to one or more
competitors during a campaign is nearly as old as the second oldest profession. These acts continue to
be very common among many political entities in the international security arena. While troubling to the
target of such acts, the reactions of many in the US Congress express an incredulity bespeaking
ignorance or hypocrisy.
As to (2), the traditional tension amongst the Pentagon, State, and Commerce as to priorities,
compatibilities, and incompatibilities regarding military and commerce Issues again mirrors a very old
phenomenon in government. The US Congress opponents to the Clinton decision should not be
objecting that it was made, but why.
As to (3), an investigation is merited to provide an assessment. This assessment needs to be based on
more than establishing temporal associations between transfers of money and political decisions. It
needs to approximate the phenomenology of intent. The assessment should not be masquerading as a
quest for some objective truth, while hiding partisan or personal political concerns.
The real national security problem is the neutering of a representative democracy and its citizens by US
elected leaders and their supporters who misrepresent the Issues as unique to US history as opposed to
characteristic activities that--in this case--may have strengthened or weakened US security. (See
Information warfare, China, and South Korea: More than a military concept. (January 16, 1997). IBPP,
4(2); Leventhal, T. (December 6, 13, 1996; January 10, 1997). The need for a United States Government
capacity to analyze and counter foreign perception management operations: Parts I, II, III. IBPP, 1(5,6,7);
Schmitt, E. (May 21, 1998). House votes to prohibit satellite exports to China. The New York Times, p.
A1, A26; The new information and communication order: Déjà vu all over again. (May 9, 1997). IBPP,
2(6).) (Keywords: Campaign Funds, China, Clinton, Democracy, National Security, Representative
Government, United States.)
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